This paper comes from a 198() summf'r seminar on ··Principle.\ and Meraphors in Biomedical Ethics·· at tire Uni1•ersity (~I' J 'irginia.
On the whole. parents have acted o n the a~su mpt io n that each baby i~ a personal possession and t hat they are the o nes to dec tdc whether to i n vc~t the economic and psychological r~so urccs needed for t he transfo rmatio n of their completely dependent biologic creat ion in to an independent social being.~ Children, \Vith few exceptions. ha ve been treated with relati ve indiffe rence. for m ost pare nts be lieved. like Montaig ne. that they "have neither mental activities nor recogniza ble bodily s hape."J Westerners who have. in this century, granted children the moral status of full persons. would do well to realize that the veneer of c i\'ility is on ly a thin one, under which lurks what so me s uggest is an innate tendency toward infanticide .~ As Philippe Aries has s hown in his history of Wes tern c hildhood. "This feeling of ind ifference towards a too fragile childhood is not rea lly very far removed from the callous ness of the Ro man or Chinese societies which practiced the exposure of newborn c hildren." 5 Indeed, the histo ry of infanticide in the West is a long and tragic one which reached. even as late as the 19th century. epidemic proponions. 6 
Preca rious Life
If life for healthy ch ildren was precarious. all the more so for those with impairments. These children were often understood as "changelings." i.e., creations of the devil rathe r than of God, who should be beaten to death in the hopes that the devil wou ld return the real child. 7 Impaired c h ildren were viewed. as R obert F . Weir has written. to be "supernatural substitutes or 'demon-children' who had taken the p lace of'rear ch i ldren."~ The only recourse for parents was to " beat the devil out" of the child. destroying it in the process. Eve n Martin Luther. w h o had some progress ive notions of parental res ponsibility. co unseled the parents of a retarded 12-year-old child to throw it ofT a bridge into the water below .~ If parenta l destruction of healthy neonates and bastards was as rampant as the historians s uggest. it was sure ly all the worse for infants bom with impairmepts. Parents rid themselves or these subhuman beings as soon as possible.
H ow is it that the West has gradua lly affirme d moral status for c hildren and en larged its notion of parental ob liga tions? H ere the historians are in agreement that Chris tianit y took the lead in gradually establishing "a socia l policy aimed at li miting parental autonom y wit h respect to offspring ... " 10 There are several prominent aspects of Chris tian reaching which have, over the course of time and des pite setbacks. brought c hildren into the moral community.
First and foremost. Christian consciousness includes children within the community of perso ns. Specifical ly. Christ declared that adu lts can enter the kingdom of heaven only by becoming as little chi ldren. It is evident that Christ had a high se nse of the dignity of the child. and was displeased by those w ho followed Him for failing to value children as He did. Thus. the following words of Christ which have done as much as any others in the Wes t to upgrade the status of the child :
And they brought young children to Him. 1 hat He s hould tOuch them: and His disciples rebuked those that brought th.em. But ~hen Jesus saw it, He was much displeased. and said unto them. 'Suffer the little children to come unto Me. and forbid them not: for or such is the kingdom of God. Verily l say unto you. whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child. he shall not enter therein.' And He to ok them up in His arms. put Hi s hands up o n them, and blessed them. (Mark, 10)" Just as modern Christian feminists take note of rhe presence of women such as Mary Magdalene among the followers of Christ. and point out how the male disciples were deeply troubled by this affirmation of women. so also those who advocate children's rights can make use of the teachings of Christ.t 2 Christ did not prescribe details of parental obligation, but He successfully inspired parents within the Christian community.
Early Theologians' Reaction
The early Christian theologians. in continuity with the dignity Christ bestowed upon children with His blessing. reacted powerfully against the practices of their surrounding Roman culture. Every human being. they insisted. has a soul, and is therefore of inherent value-that was the vita l argument. They asserted that children, having souls. were inviolable. to which religious doctrine probably more is due in the way of checking infanticide and encouraging parental responsibility than any other single idea. Earl E. Shelp, a philosopher rather than a theologian, in his analysis of the transition in Western culture from a child-denying to a childaffirming culture which begins with the 17th century. remarks: "The growing influence of Christianity contributed to these changing perceptions and practices. T he social implications of Christian teaching that children had immortal souls. just like adults, seemed fina lly to affect family life and child-rearing practices."IJ Silverman makes the same point: ''With the coming of Christianity, there was a specific theologic motivation for the importance o f species membership: the belief that all born of human parents were immortal and destined for an et)rnity of bliss or everlasting torment." 14 As a result of Christian inOuence, Roman laws governing infanticide were gradually revised, though only partially. The Church did not accomplish as much as it wanted.
There are many passages from the early Christian theologians which are cited for their clear proscription against abortion and infanticide. There are a lso some interest ing passages on parenthood which have. to my knowledge. been entirely overlooked in the contempo rary literature. In the fourth cenrury. for instance, Jerome wrote thus:
If then parents are rcsponsi ble for their children when these are of ripe age and independent . how muc h more m ust they be responsib le for t hem when. still unweaned and weak. they cannot. in the Lord's \~Ords. 'discern between their right hand and their left'. IS This heightened view of parenthood carries through the Christian theological tradition, and is echoed in L uther's prescription: "Then, if ever February, 1987 our dear God and F a ther in heaven grants you children, nurture and care for them, raise them up in the discipline, fear, and admonition of the Lord." 16 Thomas Aquinas echoed the Christian call for parental responsibility as well when he argued that child-reari ng is a part of the natura l law to be discerned by the obser va tion of a nima ls. ( Here he borrowed from the Stoic Ulpian).
In the light of this historical background. the views of contemporary C hristian medical e thicists become unde rstandable. Catho lic e thicist Charles J. McFadden. basing his position o n natural law theory, writes.
"The primary purpose of marriage includes not only the procreation of children but also their proper rearing. In this respect , man can learn much even from the animals in lower creation. latural instinct compels the beast to exhi bit a tender care and self-sacrificing solicitude for its young."l7 McFadden lists attention to bodily needs. but a lso intellectual, religious. and moral nature, as included among parental duties. Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey a lso has a lofty conception of parental responsibility which rests on a set of assumptions about divine love. God. argues Ramsey. creates nothing apart from a love which is steadfast. Creation is linked with nurturing love on t hi~ theological level. Then, Ramsey suggests that when parents procreate. "There is a trace of the original mystery by w hich God created the world because of His love." 1 8 That is. parents should link procreation with steadfast love for their chi ldre n after the image of God. T o procreate without assuming a relationship of love and loyalty with o ne's offspring is to fa ll short of Christian expectations.
The West has struggled perennially with the question of parental responsibility a nd the correla tive moral rights of children. As Lloyd de Mause has shown. Western attitudes toward ch ildren have shifted from infanticidal to a mbi valent and o nly in this cent ury. to "helpfu\." 19 Other c ult u res, despite the practice of in fa nticide, have had a much more chi ldcentered worldview than the West. which issues in a more nurturing parental ethics.2o The recent progress of the West can. in part. be attributed to the c ultural impact of religious faith. Curre ntl y. the Christian attitude toward parental duties and the dignity of the child has sp illed over int o the discussion of serio usly impaired infants. Sta nley Ha uerwas, for example. is right in suggest ing that Christian parents try to view serious ly impaired infant~ as ''d ivine gifts" who teach the community to care.2 1 This morally idealistic view of parenta l responsibilities may be a necessary one. in dialectic tension wit h the morally minimalist tendency of parems to discard impaired children for the sake of convenience.
Parental R esponse to Severely I mpaired Infa nts
One of the most important aspects of moral argument is s trictly descriptive: "What is goi ng on'?'" How we draw the pict ure of a se t of ci rcumstances is itself a moral act insofar as inaccurate and reductive images inevitably lead to mediocre ethical analysi~.22 Therefore. the first step in an exami nat ion of parental responsibilities for seriously im paired infants is an impartial consideration of parental a Lt itudes.
On the one hand. there is a wea lth of literature indicating that parents are relatively unstressed in caring for such infants. Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop, M.D .. known for his work in the surgical treatment of impaired newborns, writes the following: "I know what can be done with the child's family. I know that those children become loved and loving, that they arc creative, and that their entrance into a family is frequently looked back upon in subsequent years as an extraordinarily positive experience."2J Koop bases this thoroughly optimistic statement on a study he made of 53 parents of infants on whom he operated for correction of esophageal atresia. Eighteen parents said that the infants had no impact on the family: 14 responded "mild and positive." 10 "strong and positive." seven "mild and negative." and two, "strong and negative."2 4 Koop's conclusion is that having an impaired infant is. for most parents, a positive experience. This evidence, however. is not critically assessed by Koop. He does not, for example, question whether the parental responses might be defensive. for few parents are willing to reveal negative attitudes toward their children. In short, Koop's study is hardly full -blown. I a lso have doubts about the conclusions drawn by Rosalyn Darling in her oft-quoted Families Against Society ( 1979) . Darling describes the stages of parental adjustment to a seriously impaired child , the first of wh ich is ''anomie." i.e .. a sense of helplessness in what appears to be an overwhelming tragedy. However, with support from family and friends, this stage can often be quite brief. Then parents are able to accept their child, especially as they learn that they are able to care for it adequately. Soon, parents learn that society-includ ing pediatricians -does not share their attitude of acceptance. They therefore enter the "advocacy stage." in which they challenge social prejudices against the impaired. Darling argues that despite society and the problems which these infants pose for their parents, ''in most cases the family seems to adjust to the difficulties."25 The families which fail to adjust are ones "that had serious personal or financia l problems in addition to their handicapped chil<d." 26 For the most part. impaired infants have a positive effect on families, maintains Darling: "If anything, the presence of such a child seems to draw family members closer together as an ingroup facing the hostilities of the outside world."2 7 Darling does acknowledge that the literature "cites families torn apart by the presence of a handicapped child," but such families were already weak. 2s
Some are Impacted
There is absolutely no doubt that some parents and siblings are "positively" impacted in these cases. But literature which underlines the success stories and de-emphasizes the tragic realities of stress leading to "chronic sorrow" for parents ignores t he complexity of reality. It is therefore ideological in the worst sense of the word. 2 9
Literature Highlights Impact
On the other hand. ther is a wealth of literature which highlights the negative impact of a seriously impaired child and its family. J 0 Sand ra L. H ar-ri~. for instance. reports that parenb face relentless problems of burnout. fatigue. loss of free time. financial burden. and so forth. "Having a developmenta lly disabled child," s he -.vrites. "triggers a multitude of different. and often unpleasant. emotions in parents. Along with tenderness. love. and nurturance and deep-felt caring that is elicited by their child. there is also likely to be anger. disappointment. guilt, and other uncomfortab le fee lings."'J I S.E. Waisbren. to cite anot her example. compared the parents of young impaired children with those of normal babies and found that the former viewed themsel\'es and their chi ldren more negatively than the latter control group. 3~ Other researchers have pointed out that parents of seriously impaired children may live in a state of "chronic sorro~." and that their divorce rates are very high. 3 3 In my view. an ethical analysis of parental responsibilities must take these realities into account. Otherwise, based on the rat her excessively optimistic literatu re, it is difficult to take parents seriously when they claim that they simply cannot care for their child anymore. It is necessary that we be reminded that modern technology. in saving the lives of severely impaired infants. has also extended the caring these lives require far beyond what parents knew in past generations. The biological balance has been altered. and with it the mora l balance of the family as we have known it. As Hauerwas comments. "Our technologically expanded care has placed choices before us wh ich seem inconsistent with our original intentions of care."J~ It must be kept in mind. then. that severely impaired infants d isrupt the natural moral order. perhaps "extending a child's dependence beyond a parent's natural strengt h."J5 Under ordinary circumstances, even healthy children exact a heavy commitment from parents. but they eventually grow independent and the demands taper off. Parents re!!ain some of the freedom they sacrificed to have children through this process. H owever, with the impaired child. such is no longer the case. As one mo ther puts it, as described by Helen Featherstone, "And when l project. all I see is a sleepy life of never-ending diaper changing for a ll of us."36 This is not to dispute the claim that some pa rents have a positive experience with their impaired child. As J ohn A. Robertson has menrioned. one parent discovered altruistic emotions through caring for such a child: '' In the last months l have come closer to people and can understand them more. I have met them more deeply."3 7 T hese accounts are both genuine and moving, though the act ual response of such parents may. I suspect, be more complex than the testimonies indicate. My point here is simply to note that the picture of the parental situation that we draw must be a balanced one. for otherwise it makes no sense to consider the possible limits to parental obligation. nor to seriously envision the support services such parents may require, given the limits to a lt ruism. To ignore this complexity is a moral mistake.
Ill -Relinquishing Care: The Problem of Child Placement
There remai ns one final picture to be drawn before ethica l analysis can begin. When parents decide to relinquish care of their ~cverely impaired child. are there alternative settings a\ailab le in which such a child can develop as well as he or she wo uld in the contex t of a loving family? If satisfactory settings are unavailable. or if there really is no substitute setting which approximates the love a nd security a child receives in the fam ily, then whatever limits to parental responsibility we can discern ph ilosophically will su rely be tempered.
In fact, there is a clear consensus among socia l se rvice profes~ionals and developmental psychologists that children with disabilities are better off in a fa mil y or family-like sett ing. The Department of Hea lth a nd Huma n Services has recemly reported tha t impaired children "are more like!) to achieve their maxim um potentia l residing in small faci lities which pro\'ide them with the opportun ity to participate more fully in the normal life of the community rather than in ins tituti ons."')( There is a clear trend in the direction of deinstitutiona lization. i.e._ "the integration of handicapped persons into the community. as opposed to their placement in institutional residences."W Thus. most current literature indicates that the insti tutionversus-family-and -community-deba te has been com,incingly set tled in favo r of the latte r. 4 o As a result of this trend awa~ fro m insritutionali7ation. most ~ta tcs emphasize, at least on paper. a commitment to expanding fam ily support services . l ew York State, for instance, has issued a recent report which begins thus: " Families a re clear!~ the primary providers of care. An intact family offers sta bility. consistency. and close relationships which ca nnot be duplicated, as well as prO\·ides basic support. shelter. food. and a tten ti on to health ca re. Like othe r peop le. th e q~al it y of life for developmentally disabled people is at its best when they can live in their home."~1 The goal of the 'ew York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabi lities. then. is to reduce fam ily s tre~::.. i.e .. "to strengthen the family"s ability to ca re for a developmentally disabled fami ly member in the family's home." 4 1 As a result. :--Je\.v York is concent rating on providing respite care as a mean::. of temporary relief for fami lies. ca regiver trainin g. sibling se rvices such a::. educa tion a nd counseling. commun it y recreation for the disabled. and so fo rth . It is difficult ro imagine a more thorough reversal ol past po licies. when impaired children were typically institutionalized.
Most states. in addition to offering family support systems. also pro\'ide alte rnative family-like setti ngs. Group homes have come int o existe nce. though more are needed. Located in re~idcntial neighborhoods and professionally or para professionally ~ta iled. these ho mes may house from several to a dozen or more disabled children in an atmosphere which only imperfectly approximates the home like. In addition. there has been a trend toward individualized foster care. In 1982. for example. the Chimes Program was initiated in Baltimore to train foster pa rents to care for seriously impaired infants and young children. The Family Care Program of Ca lifornia began a foster care program for s uch chi ldren in 1968. and it has been remarkabl y successfu l. Ann Coyne has documented the successes of the Lancaster Office of Mental Retardation in Nebraska with regard to recruiting foster care. Each week. an impaired child needing foster care was introduced to the community through the loca l newspaper. and the community responded with volunteers. 4 3 Finally. there has been some progress in the area of adoption. At the forefront has been Spaulding for Children. The Child Welfare League of America has a lso been active in finding adoptive parent~ for children with impairments." 4
Parents' Choices
Never theless. parents often are faced with t he choice of keeping their child or giving it up for institutionaliza t ion. This is because the alternative ser vices listed above are not readily available. As Madeline H. Kimmish has reported in her America's Children. Who Cares?. since 1981 the federa l role in children's services has been reduced. The 1985 budget "included significant c uts in children's programs. specifically education for the handicapped . . .. 4 5 While donations from the private sector ha ve increa::.ed. the provision of human ser\'ices to needy chi ldren and their families has been seriously hampered. Due to reduced economic commitment. many states have not been able to de\'elop satisfact ory alternative family-like settings. Indeed. many family support ser\'ices are forced to charge rather heavy fees now. We may do well to remind ou rselves of the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan: "A commonp lace of political rhe toric is that the quality of a civili7ation may be measured by how it cares for its elderly. Jmt as surely. the future of a society may be forecast by how it cares for its young.'' 4 tl The movement to establish alternatives to institutionalization is succeeding gradually. but these options mentioned are availab le only for a restricted number of children. More can and should be done.
Parents. then. even in "chronic sorrow." arc often forced to continue caring for their child because they knov. that the only sure alternative is the large state institution. Realizing that this is hardly fair to their child. they may rerain custody and do their best, despite their sense of haYing reached their limits. Parents may want to relinquish care. and they may have moral reasons for doing so. but because the options are few they are wi ll ing to endure greater stress than should be expected of them.
IV-An Ethical Analysis
"How are we t o understand and live our lives.'· asks Daniel Calla han. "when the mora l demands made upon us seem to require more than we can give. more than we can make sense of. and -in our society at least -more than commands much respect and admiration'?" Callahan raises this question in response to the trend "to return to families and the home the long-term care of the chronically ill and those in need of rehabilitation." 4 R In particular, Callahan doubts the assumption that with "some modest degree of social support", families will have the moral and psychological strength to be caregivers. He acknowledges that some families may find provision of care to be a rewarding experience, but notes that families also experience feelings of oppression and guilt, for "the caregiver is often trapped in a way of life not chosen and a future direction not of his or her own." Technology keeps people alive for ever-longer periods of time, and these people need to be cared for. What is to be done? Is the answer to widen the scope of family care? Just how much caring can we expect parents to do?
For all that I have written about the dignity of the child. the correlative duties of parents, and the family or family-like setting children require, 1 do not accept the notion that parental responsibilities for severely impaired newborns are unlimited. Indeed, I think the policy of retrurning persons in need oflong-term care, especially infants, to the family must be examined most carefully. Parents and families are not morally inexhaustible, though some policy-makers assume the contrary. Technology has upset the natural moral balance and imposed burdens fit for a society of saints; but we are not all saints, even in the parental rok. It is high time medical ethicists began to consider the problem of the technological expansion of care in systematic terms. for it may be the crucial problem of our times. Indeed. if this trend continues, it may be that only a religious ethic with a strong sense of unconditional care and radical self-denial as moral vocations can sustain us. But there is little likelihood of such an ethic being generally accepted . Thus. we are at something of an 1m passe.
On the one hand. we as a society can aim at improved social support systems for the family. as the State of New York is attemptjng ro do. But on the other hand. the moral claim of others puts us. to use a metaphor. on a leash of imperative duties which are simply beyond the forms of morality that we as a society know of. Here I am in agreement with Daniel Callahan's rather pessimistic conclusions: At one level. what I am saying poinb in 1 he direction of impro,·ed systems of social support for those who care for family members. They need financial and psychologica I support of Mille and federal agencies. and 1 hey need responsive. sensitive people to give them help and to give I hem rcspilc. Bul that is hardly enough. Atanolherlevel. we need ano1her kind ofsocict) and another kind of morality. '~ Callahan suggests that only religious cultures embody the visions of sacrifice and community of which I write, and those who are not believers are left "with a severe problem.'' As he concludes, "I am not certain, but until we do [create a secular version of a way of life that fully shares burdens] I think we should be wary of asking families to undertake heroic sacrifices. ··so
Crucial Question for Ethical Analysis
The crucial question, given this framework. for ethical analysis is the following: Are there limits to the duty of beneficence on the part of parents toward their needy impaired children? To resolve this dilemma. it is necessary to consider the basis of parental duties. and whether the distinction between obligatory acts of beneficence and supererogation holds in the family as it does in the wider society. If the latter distinction does hold. then there are some actions which we cannot expect parents to perform other than voluntarily. for these actions lie beyond the call of duty.
My contention is that, in fact. the distinction between the morally obligatory and the supererogatory doe!. hold in the family. although the line of demarcation between the two is raised higher than is the case outside of "special relations.'' i.e .. in the wider public sphere of morality between strangers. This contention is not one which will be accepted by those who consider the family a community of absolutely steadfast love that satisfies all needs. I grant that family members must be ready to care for one another at considerable inconvenience, and that breaches of faithfulness in the family sho uld be viewed with disdain under anything like ordina ry ci rcumstances. But there are limits even in the family. Thus. I disagree with Alan Donagan's comment that, "Except for special institutional duties, for example. th ose of a parent, to promote the wellbeing of others at the cost of one's life or fundamental well-being would be s upererogatory."' 1 If theologian James M. Gustafson means. with his statement that " In family life self-denial is not a s upererogatory norm; it is a moral necessity for common life". that sacrifice in the family is unlimited. then I disagree with him as well. though I suspect that Gustafson docs have some limits in mind.5~ We can expect morally inspiring forms of self-denial in the family. but self-denial must be distinguished from ;elf-immolation.
In order to substantiate my proposition. I will first examine the distinction between ob ligatory acts and supe rerogation. placing special emphasis on the association of the latter with freedom. Most phi losophers grant that there are duties of beneficence. Common morality teaches us that if a pedestrian sees a child about to walk out in front of a sc hool bus. the pedestrian ought to lay a hand on the child's arm and prevent the tragedy. This act is done without any danger to the pedestrian. and the benefit to the child is enormous. It fulfills all the conditions for the duty of beneficence which are spelled ou t by James Childress and Tom Beauchamp: the child is at risk of s ignificant loss or damage: the pedestrian's act ion is needed to prevent this loss: the pedestrian's action will prevent the loss: the pedestrian's action would not present significant risk to the pedestrian. and finally. the benefit that the child will probably gain far outweighs any harm the pedestrian is likely to suffe r.5 1 H owever. if the child is already out in the m iddle of the street and the school bus is closing in fast. there is no duty for the pedestrian to leap out and push the child to the side when he or she knows that the result will be his or her own death. Such an act is beyond the call of duty, and though mora lly praiseworthy, it cannot be required of the pedestrian. This act is thus supererogatory. i.e .. the act is morally good, done for the sake of another, and places the moral agent at grave risk.5 4
Distinctions Between Duty /Supererogation
The distinction we make between duty and supererogation on the level of common morality means, as J.O. Urrnson has put it, that we are not required to be "saints and heroes." 55 It would be a moral outrage. insists Urmson, "to apply pressure" on anyone to do such a deed as sacrificing his or her life for others. 56 While we can expect persons to fulfill their duties and penalize themselves if they fail, heroic acts of self-sacrifice are strictly a matter of personal choice. Millard Schumaker establishes the same point: acts of supererogation are. like charity or grace. "free gifts" or favors which cannot be compelled.57 Supe rerogatory acts are done voluntari ly and freely chosen. It makes no sense to coerce someone to give a gift. for gifts are by definition left up to the agent to give or withhold . It can thus be said that freedom is the mot her of supererogatory virtue. as it is for all acts of altruistic love.
One of the most famous cases of supererogation in recent American history is that of a man whose plane crashed into the wintry Potomac River. He, a mere passenger with no special duties or stations. helped dozens of people out of the icy waters without the slightest thought for himself. Fi na lly, he was overcome by the cold and died. The nation was inspired by th is heroism. largely beca use it was undertaken freely and lies far beyond what we would ordinarily think required.
Granted, there are occasions when, because a part icular individual has taken a specific role in life. we can expect heroism. r A lifeguard . for example. is expected to risk his or her life by swimming off into the sea after hearing cries for help. A fireman is, by virtue of his station in life. expected to take risky actions to save others. In these cases. the distinction between moral duty and supererogation breaks down. Can the same be said for parenthood?
Distinction Holds Up
It is clear from ord inary language that, in fact. the d istinction between duty and supererogation does hold up within the family. We do speak of "saintly" parents who endure tremendous stress without complaint. P arents are understood to have inclinations o r interests ot her than caring for their children such that when they refuse to make certain sacrifices they are not moral ly blamed . Parents bri ng children into the world knowing that their responsibi lities are substantial. However, they do not bring children into the world with radica l forms of self-denial in mind. If they did so, then the birth of a severely impaired child would be cause for celebration. Parents do not opt for a luwre in which all of their central interests wi ll be displaced. Few of us would want to suggest that our chi ldren hold a blank check, though they do hold a large one.
Permit me to make use of a metaphor to underscore this argument. Children have ob\iou~ right~ based on their needs. for c:-.ample. right~ to food. shelter. education. and psychologica l nurturance. But for C\er~ right, there is a correlative parental ob ligation . Therefore. the metaphor of a leash has been suggested by William Aiken and Hugh La Follette as an apropriate way to view this correlation.:>x The right holder has the other in this case the parent-on a leash. Under relative!) normal circumstances. parents willingly and without serious threat to themselves hang onto this leash until the child reaches adulthood. H owe\er, sometime::. the pull or the leash is so strong and burdensome that the holder must simply let go. Some holders will hang on. come what may. for they arc willing to endure possibly great damage to themselves. Surely. though. we do not fault a person for, as a matter of last resort. releasing the leash.
The distinction between duty and supererogation is abo borne out b~ our response to parents who arc unexpectedly faced wi th caring for a severely impaired infant. Certain Christians might\ iew such circumstances in highly positive terms. gi,·en their theologica l notion that suffering and unconditional love arc the most lofty e thi cal ideals. And no doubt parents. who themsel\·es have adjusted to such a life of care. might 'iew these circumstances with relatiYe delight. H owe\·er. most of us fee l unea!l~ when we sec parents asked to sacrifice their "selfhood" and future for the sake of another. Displays or moral idealism are inspiring. of cour!le. but genera lly we feel grateful that we ourselves hci\C been ~pared such demands. We \>,'Onder what we would do in a !limilar situation. and often thin k that such care would be understandably beyond u~.
Even a~ parents. our common morality i~ rooted in ~ome sense of the transcendence of the individual over the communit) , in this ca:-.c. the community of the fami ly. The autonomy of the self is viewed as a good. and even a supreme good. When we are faced with difficulties that require long-term radical self-sacrifice. our ethic of moral autonomy does not suffice. Our image of human fulfillment is independent scll110od. and our sense of demanding care is quite lim ited. When forced to endure suffering. even in the fam il y. we often turn against each other. Included \\ithin our ethics of autonomy is a proscription against in\'oluntary se lf-denial.
Blustein's Comm ents
In one of the fe\\ contemporary work!> on the ethics of the family. Jcffre) Blustein makes several comments which are in accord with the \ icw suggested here. Blustcin writes: "To be acceptable. a c hild rearing practice should not force parents to choose between duty and interest but should accommodate both the needs of children and the legitimate non-parental i ntcrests of pa rcn ts. "S<J He a I so remarks that·· Parents whose mvn i ntcrcsts must always be sacrificed to those of their children are likely to end up not satisfied but miserable a nd resentfui:'60 The fact that parents are inevitably o n a leash does not mean that the pull upon them can or should be total.
If what I have s uggested is true, the n it wou ld be seemingly usefu l to develop some moral calculus to balance the interests of parents against severely impaired chi ldren . But this is an exceedingly difficu lt task, and one which may be all but impossible. The most l can do is offer some rules of thumb. For instance. if a mother refuses the option of sustained selfdenial in ra dica l form o n the basis of her appea l to self-idemity. such refusal should not be dismissed. After all, countless psychologists have a rgued that if a person has no proper love of self. that person cannot satisfactorily love others. My major thrust. however, is not t o develop a calculus. but only to establish the moral c redi bility of parents w ho. despite a certain amount of social support. simply refuse to live a life of supererogati on. It must be recognized that circumstances d o arise in which caring fo r a severely impaired child presents a significant risk to parents, and it is not clea r that the probable gain for the child outweighs the harm d one to the parents.
At this point, a case study will help to clarify some of the ideas highlighted in the above:
Mrs. Ander~on is suffering from seriou~ depres~ion. with ~uic id a l ideation. Her year-old .nfant daughter. Bet~y. i~ severely impa1red. Tho ugh the fa mil) has received oome financial relief. Betsy rem:tim a major phy>ica l <Jnd econom1c drain. Mrs. Anderson is \\orried about her husband. w ho 1~ working mo full-ti me jobs and ~a)~ that he has had it. Th..: t\10 teenage daughter~ are concerned abo ut their Ol\ n future>. De~pite the heir of a support group. Mrs. Anderson cries muc h oft he time. She IS too tired 10 enJ01 nnjt hi ng. a nd feels isolated. S he has told a :socia l worl..er at the ho>pita l. where Betsy is receiving ye t another operation. that the Andcr~ons ''ill never take Betsy home aga in.
Here is a case in which the parents of Bet sy have been asked to sacrifice too much by any ordinary standards. Even if they once had determined to care for Betsy as a matter of duty. they ha\'e been unable to ~ustain that commitment emot io na lly. In this case. because of the se ri ous nes~ o f the Andersons' plight. Betsy does not possess a moral trump card that mandates a preference for her interests at the expense of others.
V -Concluding Remarks
In arguing that parents can mora lly refuse to con tinue caring for a seriously impaired child . I by no means want t o s uggest tha t the parents have a right to end the ir child's life. If hist ory has taught us anything. it is that children and childhood have for centuries been in need of liberation. That in recent years a children's rights moYement has emerged can only be applauded, for it represents progress. Once child ren were afforded no moral status. and impa ired infants were quickly killed . Fortunately. a nd with the help of Christianity's impact on the West, chi ld ren arc now high!)
February, 1987 7J valued and the subject of many a learned volume. It is, I will assert, unfortunate that some medical ethicists look back on our tragic history and then argue that because parents have a lways rather easily engaged in infanticide, they should be allowed to do so now with impaired infants. Perhaps the worst offender here is Earl E. Shelp, who suggests that in the light of t he historical record, infanticide is ''regrettable but acceptable."61 Moreover. I accept the moral principle that children have s pecial claims on the basis of their unfulfilled needs. ll is better to heed the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child than the latest bit of pro-infanticide philosophy . That declaration reads as follows: " P rinciple 5. T he child who is physically. mentally, or socially handicapped s hall be given the special treatment, education. a nd care required by his particular condition." 6 2 The severely impaired ch ild s hould. whenever poss ible, g row up under the care of loving parents. But there are many instances when parents. for good reason, want to relinquish care. It is a moral mistake for society to impose upon parents in this area, event hough this is evidently a good way to save money. The fami ly is simply not an endless source of moral heroism. The solution to the grave problem of the technological expansion of care will be a complex one which will require more imaginat ion than is possessed by those who wou ld place the burden and stress on parents who may well long for a previous era.
